MANDATOS NO STF: ALTERNATIVA À VITALICIEDADE E INSTRUMENTO DE CONTROLE DEMOCRÁTICO.

Abstract

This article analyzes the potential lack of democratic legitimacy in the composition of the Supreme Federal Court (STF), highlighting the lack of effective mechanisms to curb the power of its justices and the ineffectiveness of the Senate's role as an external counterweight to the Court's power, highlighting, among other things, the merely formal hearings conducted by the Upper Chamber. It also addresses the significant increase in the Court's political activity due to the judicialization of politics, reflected in judicial activism, culminating in the Court's encroachment on the powers constitutionally reserved for the Legislative and Executive branches. Furthermore, it addresses the potential impacts of the tenure of the position and the consequent accumulation of power, as opposed to the fact that the position is non-elective, undermining potential popular accountability. Finally, it proposes the adoption of a fixed term for the position of Supreme Federal Court justice, analyzing the advantages of rotating the Court's members, highlighting, among them, the oxygenation of ideas, a greater balance between the branches of government, and the mitigation of the deficit in popular representation in this segment of power.