A INEFETIVIDADE DO CONTRATO DE TRABALHO INTERMITENTE NA REDUÇÃO DO DESEMPREGO NO BRASIL

Abstract

This paper analyzes the effectiveness of the intermittent employment contract, introduced by the Labor Reform (Law No. 13,467/2017), as a tool for reducing unemployment and informality in the Brazilian labor market. The research examines the implications for labor and social security conditions arising from this contractual modality, comparing its implementation with the constitutional principles of human dignity and the valorization of work. The analysis shows that, although the legislator sought to expand hiring methods and combat informality, the intermittent contract yields limited results in job creation. From a legal perspective, the modality is criticized for excessively flexibilizing historically established rights, weakening labor protections and creating situations of economic and social vulnerability. Regarding social security, tthe regulation in question also presents gaps, if the worker receives less than the minimum wage, the contribution in this case will not have any effect for the purposes of eligibility and payment of benefits. It is therefore concluded that the intermittent employment contract, although formally aligned with global trends toward more flexible labor relations, does not effectively achieve the objectives of reducing unemployment, nor does it ensure decent living conditions for workers. On the contrary, it perpetuates the precariousness of these relationships and contradicts the principles of decent work, as advocated by the ILO and the UN 2030 Agenda, especially Sustainable Development Goal No. 8, which seeks to promote full, productive, and sustainable employment for all.