O SISTEMA ELEITORAL BRASILEIRO E AS ELEIÇÕES MAJORITÁRIAS: UMA PROPOSTA DE MODIFICAÇÃO LEGISLATIVA À LUZ DA DEMOCRACIA BRASILEIRA NA DÉCADA DE 2020

Abstract

This study investigates Brazilian democracy within a context of growing political polarization, increasing voter abstention, and distrust in the political system. The central issue arises from the recognition, as stated by Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, that no electoral system can simultaneously meet all the criteria of an ideal choice model, requiring concessions to be made. The relevance of this research lies in the pursuit of institutional solutions, in the form of an electoral model that eliminates the second round of majoritarian elections, aiming to mitigate existing problems, promote stability and efficiency, and restore public confidence in the democratic process, within the existing limitations. The adopted methodology was bibliographic research, through the analysis of studies, scientific articles, news sources, and data compilation, within an interdisciplinary perspective that applies social studies and mathematical models to critically analyze the current electoral system. This work is based on Kenneth J. Arrow’s studies, such as the Impossibility Theorem, and Robert Axelrod’s Game Theory research. The results demonstrate that, although no model is perfect, institutional adjustments can encourage cooperative behavior, favor candidates with broader general acceptance, reduce “wasted votes”, and mitigate effects such as the “spoiler effect”. The proposal to allow voters to indicate two preferences simultaneously has shown potential to reduce polarization, limit the influence of strategic voting, enhance stability, and generate savings in electoral resources, while preserving the constitutional principles of direct, secret, universal, and periodic suffrage. It is concluded that, even without the possibility of an ideal system, the integration of theoretical analysis with viable institutional proposals can lead to significant advances in the stability of Brazilian democracy. The multidisciplinary approach adopted here contributes to the debate on electoral reform and opens space for future research on the implementation of alternative methods in Brazil.