O SIGNIFICADO COMO USO NAS INVESTIGAÇÕES FILOSÓFICAS DE WITTGENSTEIN

Abstract

This work aims to present the concept of meaning in the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889- 1951), focusing on the second phase of his thought, developed in the work Philosophical Investigations (1953). To this end, the quote by Augustine of Hippo (353-430 AD) that opens this work by Wittgenstein will be analyzed initially, since from this analysis, the contrast that exists in the understanding of meaning between the two phases of the author's thought becomes evident. The first phase of his thought will then be explained, since, through it, it is possible to understand the radical change in his conception regarding the concept of meaning, as well as the change in his approach to investigating this concept. Finally, it is understood that this change culminates in the valorization of everyday life, through the observation of the phenomena of pragmatic life, the source of the creation of concepts: language games, rules and form of life. With this, we seek to highlight the relevance of such concepts so that the meaning of language expressions acquires significant value, since the meaning of these expressions is contained in the use we make of them.