Causalidade por liberdade: a ideia de liberdade transcendental como condição para a liberdade prática na filosofia kantiana

Abstract

The present paper aims to discuss the concept of freedom in the Critique of pure reason, by Immanuel Kant, as a transcendental idea that is necessary to human reason, fundamental to the escape of the causal determinist, resulting from the structure of the knowledge process in Kant's philosophy. Initially, we address how Kant characterizes scientific knowledge, regulated by the subject, and establish the difference between what is accessible to us in the experience -- the appearances -- from the things in themselves -- the noumena -- that, for being inaccessible to us, thus can't be known. Secondly, we handle how the idea of freedom emerges inside metaphysical questions, in the discourse of the third antinomy of pure reason, and how transcendental freedom is essential to the comprehension and proper reasoning of practical freedom. In the end, we transition to the Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals, a work in which Kant explores more precisely the practical use of reason, that is, of freedom applied in experience. With that, we aim to demonstrate the importance of the transcendental idea of freedom in Immanuel Kant's first critical work, such as its essentiality to our actions if considered freely.